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ABSTRACT
Digital technologies are increasingly used in elections around the world. Where the
resources and capacity of the state are limited, some have argued that such
technologies make it possible to rapidly “leapfrog” to cleaner and more credible
elections. This article argues that the growing use of these technologies has been
driven by the fetishization of technology rather than by rigorous assessment of their
effectiveness; that they may create significant opportunities for corruption that
(among other things) vitiate their potential impact; and that they carry significant
opportunity costs. Indeed, precisely because new technology tends to deflect
attention away from more “traditional” strategies, the failure of digital checks and
balances often renders an electoral process even more vulnerable to rigging than it
was before. These observations are not intended as a manifesto against the
digitization of elections; apart from anything else, we argue that the drivers of the
adoption of these new methods are too powerful to resist. But the analysis draws
attention to the importance of more careful assessments of the problems, as well as
the benefits, of such technologies – and to the need for more careful planning in
their deployment.
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There has been a remarkable increase in the deployment of digital technologies in elec-
tions over the last two decades – a trend that is clearest in Africa and Asia. In Africa,
roughly half of all national-level elections now involve digital equipment of some
form, most notably biometric voter registration/identification and electronic results
transmission.1 The stated driver for this has been similar everywhere: in circumstances
where elections are problematic – because of malpractice, or procedural problems, or
both – digital technology is seen as a fix, able to compensate for the weakness of the
state and to deter malpractice by politicians and officials. The hope is that new technol-
ogy will enhance the electoral environment in three main ways: by making the function-
ing of the electoral commission more robust and efficient, by reducing the scope for
electoral manipulation, and by generating greater clarity and transparency regarding
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election outcomes. On this basis, the proponents of new technology also expect it to
boost the process’s legitimacy – and hence that of the elected government.
Yet, while there are clearly cases in which such technologies guard against malprac-
tice and boost public confidence in the short term, there are also examples in which they
prove to be ineffective. Recent experience suggests that such technology relies on
complex procedures that are liable to break down, may actually increase popular suspi-
cion of manipulation, and encourage complacency towards traditional forms of election
oversight. Given this, when considering which types of digitization are worth the cost, it
is important that greater attention is paid to the limitations and unintended conse-
quences of these new methods.
Digital technologies can of course be used in many ways in elections, including new
communication technologies such as Whatsapp. However, our focus is solely on the
digital technologies deployed by electoral commissions: those associated with electronic
voter registration, voter verification, and results transmission. We are not the first
researchers to question the rush to these new ways of running elections. A number of
papers by practitioners have been published in this area, including two edited collections.
The first, curated by Michael Yard of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES), addresses the “progress and pitfalls” of new technology deployed by state electoral
commissions.2 In particular, Yard helpfully distinguishes electoral efficiency from electoral
transparency and argues that while technology can help to achieve both goals, it tends to be
implemented in a way that promotes the former over the latter. By creating “black box”
components that “lead to more efficient development and employment”, he argues, new
technology risks transferring power “away from the many” into the “hands of the few”.3
A second collection, edited by Astrid Evrensel, echoes many of Yard’s points, while
also emphasizing the “organization and logistical challenges” that new technology can
generate.4 The analysis of Evrensel and her colleagues is particularly significant because
it highlights the heavy dependence of electoral commissions on the support and exper-
tise provided by the international community, who often help to both fund and procure
digital equipment. As Akumiah notes with reference to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), this raises serious questions about the long-term sustainability of the
“digital revolution”.5
A number of other publications have identified similar challenges. Joel Barkan has
argued that new technology in Africa often fails because insufficient attention is paid
to the broader management structures it needs to function.6 In other contexts,
studies have questioned the cost of digital solutions and highlighted how automation
can improve the efficiency of one aspect of the electoral process7 but leave other
major issues, such as voter intimidation, unaddressed.8 Worse still, digital technology
can encourage a narrow focus on particular parts of the electoral process to the
neglect of the broader political environment and campaigns – a point acknowledged
even by some enthusiasts.9
We build on these existing discussions to develop our own critique. More specifically,
we draw on Yard’s discussion of the “undemocratic” elements of election technology to
demonstrate how the complex science that underpins digital processes can render elec-
tions less transparent, and follow Evrensel and Akumiah in stressing the international
dimension of the spread of new technology.10 However, we also seek to go beyond
these studies in three important ways. First, the analysis contained in Yard and Evrensel’s
collections is now seven years old, and so does not cover the recent wider rush to digital
technology. As a result, these authors did not focus on the central question animating our
2 N. CHEESEMAN ET AL.
analysis: why has the spread of digital technology gathered pace at the same time that evi-
dence of its limitations has become ever more apparent? By bringing the story up-to-date,
we are able to advance a new explanation of these contradictory trends.
Our second contribution is to refocus the debate on the political, rather than the logis-
tical, barriers to the effective deployment of new technology. While some important
journal articles have been published more recently – such as Piccolino’s analysis of
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana and Debos’s work on Chad11 – they have tended to adopt a rela-
tively narrow focus, addressing a particular aspect of the electoral process in one or two
cases. At the same time, the wider literature has mainly focused on procedural challenges,
paying less attention to the political context within which technology is introduced. By
contrast, we seek to place political factors centre-stage, considering how the quality of
democracy and the independence of the electoral commission impact the performance
of new technologies. Unsurprisingly, we find that the greatest gains from digitization
come in countries where the quality of democracy is higher and the electoral commission
more independent. This is significant, because it implies that new technology is likely to
be least effective where it is most needed. As John Githongo, Kenya’s former anti-corrup-
tion tsar, put it: “you cannot digitize integrity”.12
The third contribution of this article is to demonstrate how new technology may
have damaging effects even when it generates procedural improvements in the way
that elections are run. While Yard pointed to the way that election technology can
empower a small technocratic elite, and Gonggrijp and colleagues have found that
digital processes may become a source of mistrust,13 neither fully explores the way in
which this can undermine domestic and international confidence in electoral outcomes.
By looking at recent cases, we are able to demonstrate exactly how the unintended con-
sequences of digitization may generate such negative externalities.
Investigating the effectiveness of new technology is complicated by the fact that it is
expected to achieve a number of different ends, and the difficulty of establishing criteria
for judging whether an intervention has been “effective”. As an extensive literature has
addressed issues of logistical capacity, we focus our efforts on the capacity of digital pro-
cesses to render elections cleaner, more transparent, and hence legitimate. We draw on
data from a wide range of sources, including election observation reports from around
the world that typically feature evaluations of the performance of electoral commis-
sions; public opinion surveys that provide insights into the attitudes of ordinary
voters; the statements and behaviours of elite actors that give a sense of the beliefs of
political leaders; and, our direct experience of watching elections in Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria, and Uganda. These cases have been selected because they have very similar
electoral systems, having been former British colonies, but vary considerably when it
comes to the quality of democracy and electoral management, allowing us to investigate
the impact of these factors on digital processes. Instead of specifying an arbitrary
threshold for “effectiveness”, we ask whether there was meaningful improvement –
that is, changes in the logistical management and transparency of the process that
were sufficient to impact on the overall quality of the elections – and whether this
can be attributed to the use of new technology. Focussing on improvement over time
at the country level has the advantage of accounting for the conditions on the
ground in each case, rather than seeking to impose an ideal standard.
We build our argument in five stages. The first section discusses the drivers of new
technology. In particular, we highlight two issues that have yet to be fully addressed in
the literature: the tendency of a range of influential actors to fetishize digitization
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technology, and the way in which the high cost of new technology generates rent-
seeking opportunities, which in turn help to explain its popularity. In the second
section, we draw attention to another aspect of the “digital fallacy”: the widespread
belief that technologies will resolve logistical challenges and promote electoral quality
and transparency. Finally, we identify a further unintended consequence of the intro-
duction of digital technology that is often overlooked; namely, that it tends to distract
opposition parties from focusing on effectively deploying party agents and leads to
funds being directed away from the provision of domestic monitors, leaving other
parts of the systemmore vulnerable – especially if digital processes break down. By eval-
uating new technology in terms of the “opportunity cost” that it represents, we highlight
its true implications.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this article suggests that although digitization
may be unstoppable its impact in the world’s new democracies is likely to be mixed. In
more democratic contexts such as Ghana, new technology has realized some of the
gains advertised by its proponents. But in the more difficult cases such as Kenya, where
compromised electoral commissions operate in semi-authoritarian contexts, the introduc-
tion of new technology has generated few benefits. This is not to say that digital technology
is always to blame for electoral controversies. In many of the cases we cover, elections
would probably not have been significantly better in the absence of digitization. But
digital electoral technologies are expensive: they must deliver real benefits to be worth
that cost. Given this, their adoption needs to be carefully assessed on a case-by-case
basis. At present, digitization is being pursued in many countries that lack the political
will and institutional framework necessary for it to function effectively.
Explaining the digitization drive: fetishization and rent-seeking
National elections by secret ballot and adult suffrage necessarily involve the processual
combination of particular techniques, and devices – from the pens and indelible ink
used to mark ballot papers and voters’ fingers to voter identification cards and ballot
papers14: what we have elsewhere called the “voting machine”.15 Elections have thus
always involved technological innovation of a sort, and non-digital technologies were
novel to many of those who organized and participated in the electoral process when it
was first introduced. However, in recent decades the equipment used during elections
has become increasingly hi-tech. Biometric registration records voters’ fingerprints, faces
and/or other bio-data; biometric identification verifies this data electronically at the
polling station to clear an individual to vote; and, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE),
Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) systems
offer alternative technologies for recording voter choice. Finally, there are electronic
systems – often based on mobile phone applications – for counting and collating votes.
Latin America led the way in many of these innovations; beginning with a “compu-
terized voting pilot” in Colombia in 1992, soon followed by a computerized registration
system linked to a photographic identification card with a barcode.16 In 1998, voters in
Brazil cast their ballots via “computers connected to a secure local area network”. Sub-
sequently, Venezuela introduced the scanning of ballots and electronic transmission of
results.17 The accelerating spread of these technologies to other parts of the world – par-
ticularly Asia and sub-Saharan Africa – has had multiple drivers. Civil society groups
and opposition parties, bilateral and international agencies for electoral support, elec-
toral management bodies and incumbent regimes have all supported this trend –
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indeed, sometimes they have demanded new technologies. The motives of these groups
are varied, and have included the fact that similar developments have helped to
strengthen potentially vulnerable electoral systems in important “test cases”, such as
India. Voting has been conducted electronically in the world’s largest democracy
since 1999, and although concerns remain that these machines are vulnerable to
hacking,18 some commentators have credited them with increasing public confidence
in the electoral process.19 However, it is also true that popular and policy debates
about digitization tend to share another consistent element: all involve a degree of
fetishization, crediting technologies “with powers they do not have (e.g. the ability to
solve social problems, to keep the economy vibrant, or to provide us with a superior
life)”.20
The “biometrics revolution”, as enthusiasts call it, promises developmental trans-
formation.21 The websites of companies that market these technologies foreground
this fetishization, imputing to their devices an innate power that transcends politics
and human agency. Their self-presentation emphasizes modernity, offering “clear pro-
cesses, supported by state-of-the-art technology”.22 They rhetorically lament the back-
wards state of many electoral processes and worry that “[t]echnology has revolutionized
so many aspects of our lives – services, lifestyles and living standards but elections have
been left behind”.23 These narratives cast digital technologies as “anti-politics”
machines, providing simple technical solutions to complex social and political pro-
blems.24 For the public and civil society, the technology companies promise to enable
“citizens to access services and exercise their rights securely and easily”, and for govern-
ments and electoral management bodies they offer a vision of panoptical modern state-
ness: “helping governments manage the civil identity cycle in the increasingly mobile
and globalized world of the twenty-first century”.25 For international or bilateral
agencies, meanwhile, technologies provide a way to channel electoral support
towards procedural issues that may allow them to avoid accusation of partisanship
and neo-colonialism.26
Some visions of the modern are, straightforwardly, marketing strategies by technol-
ogy companies. For example, one major player in the field has sponsored an “Inter-
national Elections Advisory Council”, composed of retired national election officials,
to promote the idea that digital technology offers a ready solution to electoral chal-
lenges. In one of the Council’s publications a former South African electoral commis-
sioner describes how digital technologies “leapfrogged [voting] to the brink of the
twenty-first century”.27
As self-serving as such strategies may be, these companies are exploiting wider atti-
tudes, not creating them. Indeed, it is important not to understate the allure of new
technologies of identification for the citizen, for whom biometric voters’ cards and
the like offer a way to make claims on the state or to renegotiate social status.28
Mobile phones have created new economic and social opportunities in countries
around the world – it is not surprising that many voters believe that similar technology
can have a transformative impact on elections. As one elections expert who has worked
for international observation missions in over 15 countries put it:
… you get this almost blind faith that technology will make everything better, even though it
can be extremely difficult to introduce… it is almost as if there is a suspension of disbelief
because donors and opposition leaders are so desperate for something – anything – to fix the
process.29
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This confidence often extends to the mass public. In Kenya, for example, a nationally
representative survey conducted by Ipsos in early October 2017 found that 58% of
respondents agreed that “Elections that use digital technology are always more free
and fair” (emphasis added). This is despite the fact that, as we shall see, the widespread
use of digital technology in the presidential poll of 8 August 2017 did not prevent it
from being found to be “illegal, null and void” by the Supreme Court. In other
words, the effectiveness of the kind of marketing described above reflects the wider
appeal of digital technologies and the persistent power of modernity; in one study in
the US, voters expressed a preference for new voting technologies in the (un-evidenced)
belief that they were more robust.30
This process is not unique, nor disconnected from other developmental trends, but
rather reflects a much broader tendency to overlook the potential limitations of new
technology when it comes to transforming lives in the global south – and, indeed,
the global north. As David Harvey has argued, “[a]ll manner of social actors (corpor-
ations, entrepreneurs, and various branches of government, most particularly the mili-
tary) endow technology with causative powers to the point that they will uncritically –
and sometimes disastrously – invest in it in the naive belief that it will somehow provide
solutions to whatever problems they are encountering”.31 In a sense, this argument is an
extension of James Scott’s famous critique of high modernism, as a “form of modernity,
characterized by an unfaltering confidence in science and technology as means to
reorder the social and natural world”.32 Scott argues that seeing the world through
this lens is deeply problematic because placing too much confidence in new scientific
discoveries means that the potential flaws in technology are not detected, leading to
developmental disasters.
Recent research has often echoed this analysis. Writing about the World Summit on
the Information Society, an event supported by the United Nations General Assembly
in 2003 and 2005 that involved 50 heads of state/government and vice-presidents,33
Marc Raboy records that the days leading up the event “were marked by almost surre-
alist fetishization of technology”.34 Similarly, Shahid Alv, discussing the use of technol-
ogy in education, urges caution and argues that the importance of local context is too
often “ignored or downplayed in the rush to fetishize technology”.35 Moving back to the
realm of elections, the great confidence placed in digitization means that the successes
of new technology have often been championed while its failures are overlooked. As a
well-travelled elections expert who has worked for IFES – a company that often advises
electoral commissions on these processes – put it:
You go to so many countries where everyone has this incredible confidence in the potential of
technology… even when the ruling party has no interest in free and fair elections. It makes you
want to shout…“just digitizing things is not going to save you”… and it is going to cost a lot [of
money].36
In Ghana, biometric registration and identification were introduced for elections in
2012. In the context of chronic complaints over the accuracy of the voting register, the
combined system of registration and verification was presented as a qualified success.37
In practice, however, there were multiple problems, most notably that in some cases
verification devices failed to identify individuals’ thumbprints, or failed entirely.38 Sub-
sequent research indicated that machines were more likely to fail where no observers
were present, and that machine failure was correlated with over-voting.39 These
anomalies did not become major issues partly because another, more pressing, issue
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of credibility arose – over vote-tallying and recording40 – distracting attention from
them. Despite this uncertain experience, neither candidates nor officials (nor the
donors who had supported their introduction) questioned the inherent value of
digital technologies.41 Indeed, one politician explicitly saw this as a step on the way
to even more technology – an understanding apparently linked to a mistaken belief
regarding how European elections are run:
…we are only praying that a day may come when we will do e-voting. Not e-transmission but e-
voting. I was in UK… you put your card there it makes a sound, nobody, there’s no agent,
nobody is there at the polling centre.42
In describing this attachment to technology as fetishization, we do not mean to
understate the genuine potential of digital technologies. Where voters’ rolls have
been bloated by multiple registration, biometric registration may significantly reduce
them. Where the presence of large numbers of “ghost” voters – those deceased, or
who have moved elsewhere – has created space for rigging through impersonation, bio-
metric voter identification can provide an effective check on fraud. As the Common-
wealth Observer Group opined after Nigeria’s 2015 elections: “… the introduction of
biometric Permanent Voter Cards is, in our view, a major factor in enhancing the integ-
rity of the electoral process”.43
However, it is clear that the introduction of new technology cannot fully safeguard
an election because some irregularities – such as gerrymandering, the intimidation of
voters, and voter bribery – cannot be prevented by digitization.44 Moreover, even in
the areas in which such technologies have the greatest transformative potential, they
cannot do this work by themselves; rather, their efficacy is dependent on effective
implementation. Biometric technology cannot prevent multiple registration if the
data are not audited to prevent duplication, as was evidenced by widespread and report-
edly flagrant biometric multiple registration in Somaliland in 2008.45 Similarly, an audit
ahead of the 2011 elections in the DRC found 700,000 so-called “doublons” – multiple
registrations – but officials ruled that “it was too late to clean up the roll”.46
The potential for technology to be manipulated – or to simply break down – is rarely
publicly admitted by those who seek to promote its use. Yet stories along these lines are
easy to find if you look for them. For example, while the peaceful transfer of power in
the Nigerian polls of 2015 has been claimed as a triumph for digitization,47 many parts
of the process did not function as intended. Most notably, 91% of the machines failed to
consistently verify voter identity in the presidential poll according to European Union
(EU) observers.48 Thus, in Nigeria, as in so many other cases, the public image of tech-
nology does not reflect the reality.
A deep faith in modernity is not the only driver of the digitization of elections. Those
who are involved in the design and procurement of new technology may also have a
more cynical motivation: personal or corporate financial gain. The vast cost of new
technology, and the fact that it involves purchasing large amounts of expensive equip-
ment, makes it a classic target for rent-seeking activities. Given that digitization is often
attempted in contexts in which there are often weak checks and balances against corrupt
activity, it is unsurprising that it has often been accompanied by financial scandals
involving multinational companies and host governments.
The cost of implementing biometric verification software is often particularly bur-
densome, because one kit needs to be purchased for each polling station. In the
Kenyan election of 2013, the “total cost of all the computers, mobile phones, and
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accessory equipment” alone – not including the Independent Electoral and Boundary
Commission’s (IEBC) other operating costs – was estimated at US$120 million, or
US$10 for each voter.49 Ahead of the DRC’s 2005 election: “A staggering US
$40,160,000 was needed to buy the 10,000 biometric registration kits and to have
them transported… to Kinshasa.”50 Beyond the cost of the equipment itself, the need
to distribute the machines around the country, and to pay for staff training and main-
tenance – in addition to the challenge of keeping equipment up-to-date – compounds
the problem. Just four years after the initial procurement in Kenya, the IEBC purchased
an entirely new “integrated electoral management system”, at a cost that is estimated to
be over EUR 40 million. Biometric registration is usually cheaper, because a smaller
number of kits can be used to cover a larger area, but it is still costly. For example,
the use of new technology raised the cost of the registration process to US$9 per
person in Nigeria and US$20 per person in Afghanistan.51
It is the high cost of election technology, and the fact that it tends to be introduced in
poorer countries, that has made many new democracies increasingly dependent on inter-
national support to run elections, as argued by Evrensel and Akumiah. For example, when
Somaliland acquired what was touted to be the most advanced voter registration and
identification system in the world in 2016, this was only possible because international
donors picked up the EUR 13.5 million bill – more than EUR 10 per voter.52 As the
United Nations Secretary-General bemoaned in 2009, “Some of the poorest countries
in the world have chosen some of the most expensive electoral processes and technology
… I am concerned about techniques and systems that might cause a State, in the conduct
of its own elections, to be financially dependent on donors.”53 Moreover, this funding
challenge often generates a complex triangle of economic relations between the donors
who finance new technology, the government or electoral officials who procure it, and
the international companies that provide it. In this set of relationships, donors can
gain by using their leverage to ensure that key contracts go to businesses that operate
in their jurisdiction, companies can gain by generating large profits, and officials can
benefit by requiring kick-backs to process a contract.
As a result, going hi-tech can attract “a wave of profiteers”.54 In Kenya, the Canadian
government offered to help secure the loans needed to pay for the introduction of digital
equipment in 2013, but only if it was purchased from an approved company under
Canadian supervision. This practice was highly controversial and following a review
of election expenditure the Public Accounts Committee of the Kenyan parliament
asked the Attorney General to institute proceedings to recover “Sh305 million from
Canadian Commercial Corporation”55 that had been paid as a “brokerage fee” as
part of this process.56 Similar issues have emerged in relation to the 2011 election in
the DRC, after which a Belgian company, ZETES, was sued in Belgium for electoral
fraud following claims of corruption during the procurement process of biometric
voter registration kits.57
It is important not to exaggerate the extent of this problem. Technology has been
introduced in many countries without subsequent scandals. Nonetheless, it is important
to recognize that in states with a history of corruption, some of the support for digitiz-
ation may be disingenuous – motivated more by a desire to open up fresh rent-seeking
opportunities than to improve the quality of elections. This point is significant for the
ways in which elections play out for three reasons. First, problematic procurement pro-
cesses can lead to poorly qualified companies getting contracts that they are ill-equipped
to fulfil.58 Second, faulty procurement procedures often require the process to be
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conducted a second time, delaying the purchase of equipment so late that it cannot be
effectively piloted. Third, corruption scandals that involve – or are believed to involve –
electoral officials, can dramatically undermine public confidence in the broader elec-
toral process, as in the cases of Kenya and the DRC described here.59
The digital fallacy (1): more robust and better managed electoral
processes
One of the claims made for digital technology is that it can strengthen electoral pro-
cesses in countries where state and electoral management bodies have limited capacities.
But ensuring that such technology is properly used is far from straightforward. On the
one hand, it requires careful planning and complex logistics to ensure that data is
inputted, staff are trained, and sufficient power is provided. Devices and servers must
be tested and replacements have to be available if devices break down. Many of these
challenges are also present when it comes to manual (paper) processes – but some
are not. For example, if competitive procurement processes lead to a different
company conducting voter registration than the company selected to provide the data-
base to manage the electoral roll, it is essential to make sure that the two sets of software
are compatible. In some cases this is not a major challenge, but in Malawi it took many
months and considerable resources to achieve this, which left inadequate time to actu-
ally audit and clean the roll.60 On the other hand, technology requires many other forms
of human input. Code has to be written for programmes; servers have to be protected;
and, digital registers have to be maintained, cleaned, and kept secure. Such realities
increase the cost of an election and render them increasingly complicated processes:
although considerable work has been done to simplify the user interface for new equip-
ment, additional timelines and training requirements, not greater simplicity, are often
the corollaries of digitization.
The weight of these logistical challenges means that things can and often do go
wrong. For example, biometric registration or verification devices may not arrive in
time, power cuts or insufficient battery life may stop them from working, and so on.
The scale of these issues tends to vary at different points in the electoral cycle: as a
rough rule, biometric registration has tended to work better than biometric verification,
simply because the time pressure is so much more intense when millions of voters have
to be processed in a single day. This was apparent in Chad in 2016, where the new reg-
ister apparently eliminated much double registration, but actual voting was still
chaotic.61 In Kenya’s 2013 elections, a new biometric registration process worked rela-
tively well, delivering a register that appears to have been more transparent than any
previous one.62
However, attempts to use this register for verification were very far from a success.
Electronic voter identification kits failed at some point during the day in over half of the
country’s polling stations,63 and polling staff reverted to manual registers. In turn, this
process was complicated by a greater degree of uncertainty over what the definitive reg-
ister actually was, since printed versions differed slightly. A new electronic results trans-
mission system – another innovation that had not been tested or scrutinized – failed
even more comprehensively.64 Early result transmissions recorded a remarkably high
number of rejected ballots; it was then announced that the system had arbitrarily mul-
tiplied the number of rejected ballots by eight, though how and why has never been
explained. Then, following an initial stream of results, the flow of information
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ground to a halt. It later transpired that a server failure had meant that the system could
not cope with the “volume of data that was being transmitted”.65 A lack of time to test
the system, and the failure to provide a backup, had undermined one of the core reforms
designed to protect electoral integrity following the disputed election of 2007. These
problems were subsequently blamed on the IEBC’s “evermore compressed timelines”
and lack of “sufficiently thorough preparation”.66
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the quality of the 2013 Kenya elections
– in terms of how “clean” they were – would have been significantly better if digital
technology had not been used. The IEBC operated a manual back up – that is, the tra-
ditional method for running an election – that kicked in when the technology failed,
and argued that it performed well. The Supreme Court agreed, upholding the result.
But even if the manual process did hold up – something that remains controversial –
it is clear that new technology generated significant negative outcomes. First, the col-
lapse of digital processes undermined the confidence of opposition supporters and
many neutral commentators in the election, despite the findings of the Supreme
Court. Second, the vast cost of the technology led to few improvements, but took
money away from other potential investments, a point that we explore in greater
detail below.
The technological failures in Kenya’s 2013 elections were particularly high-profile,
but not unusual. In addition to the problems with the biometric kits already noted in
Nigeria, there were also significant problems with the collation system. According to
EU observers, the electronic transmission of results from state-level collation centres
to the presidential returning officer via email represented the weakest part of the
process.67 These issues are not necessarily fatal. Polling staff can learn quickly and
some of the problems noted in Nigeria were significantly reduced in the gubernatorial
elections that followed two weeks later.68 But it is nevertheless important to recognize
that the introduction of digital technology cannot resolve the problem of weak states
and electoral commissions precisely because effective implementation requires a
strong and flexible administrative structure in the first place.
The digital fallacy (2): more transparent and clean elections
Another claim made of digitization is that it can generate cleaner polls. While this may
be true in a limited sense, it is clear that many kinds of electoral manipulation defy
control by digital technologies: as Marielle Debos has pointed out in the case of
Chad, biometric technology “raised hopes, but did not radically change the rules of
the political game”.69 Schedler’s famous “menu of manipulation” offers dishes that
are served long before biometric registration/identification becomes relevant, and the
advantages of incumbency are not necessarily diminished by biometry.70 For
example, in the world’s electoral-authoritarian regimes, governments often outspend,
intimidate, displace and generally disadvantage their opponents, and many of these
strategies are unaffected by whether or not voter identification is controlled by finger-
print, retinal scan or digital photograph.
In this sense, digitization may improve the quality of some aspects of an electoral
process without actually generating an election that comes close to being credible.
Uganda’s 2016 elections exemplify this: voters were registered biometrically, and
their identities verified. Both processes were generally successful; so too was a donor-
funded system that allowed some voters to confirm their registration and identify
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polling stations. But the election was marked by gross disparities, with the ruling
National Resistance Movement (NRM) able to spend much more, while opposition
leader Kizza Besigye’s efforts were hampered by his arrest and the intimidation of his
supporters. Moreover, the results revealed implausibly high turnouts in NRM strong-
holds.71 Digital technologies neither levelled the playing field, nor boosted opposition
confidence.
Unsurprisingly, problematic outcomes have been recorded in other authoritarian
contexts. For example, the case of Azerbaijan offers an apparently unintentional, and
comic, insight into the ability of ruling parties to turn election technology to their
own ends. In 2013, the credibility of a mobile phone app purportedly designed to com-
municate results was fatally undermined when it released the figures a day before a single
ballot had been cast.72 Nor is this the only example of a case in which the introduction of
technology has been manipulated for partisan gain. In Mozambique in 2014, the regime
turned biometric registration into a technique of manipulation, suppressing registration
in opposition areas by sending inadequate equipment and undertrained teams.73
But what of countries in which elections are held in contexts that are neither fully
democratic, nor as controlled by the ruling party as they are in Azerbaijan and
Uganda? The way in which the political context shapes the impact of new technologies
is well illustrated by a comparison between Ghana and Kenya. When Kenya first intro-
duced biometric technology in 2013 the country had held four multiparty elections but
remained very much a “competitive-authoritarian”74 state in which the government
retained effective control over a political system that Freedom House ranked as only
“Partly Free”. Against this backdrop, successive electoral commissions have been criti-
cized for being highly vulnerable to government manipulation.75 Indeed, following
intense criticism of the Electoral Commission of Kenya’s performance in the wake of
the 2007 election controversy, which triggered ethnic clashes that led to the death of
over 1,000 people, it was disbanded and replaced by the IEBC.
By contrast, when Ghana began to digitize its electoral process in 2012 it had already
emerged as one of the continent’s leading democratic lights and was rated as “Free” by
Freedom House. This process was partly driven by, and in turn contributed to, the
emergence of a particularly assertive and independent electoral commission under
the leadership of its widely respected chair, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan. Not only did the com-
mission introduce reforms, such as transparent ballot boxes, which boosted public con-
fidence, but the fact that Afari-Gyan presided over transfers of power that brought both
major parties to power also meant that he was seen to be politically neutral.76
These different contexts are critical to understanding the greater success of the intro-
duction of new technology in Ghana as compared to Kenya. As we have seen, digital
technology did not perform well in the Ghanaian elections of 2012. However, the com-
mission subsequently worked to improve its protocols, providing additional training
and introducing measures to allow those not recognized by the kits to vote in other
ways. In some instances, this work was driven by the initiative of electoral officials
determined to rebuild their reputation. In other cases, it was mandated by the courts
following pressure from opposition parties and civil society groups operating in a rela-
tively open political landscape.77 As a result, far fewer problems were recorded with the
performance of digital technology in the 2016 general elections, with no complaint
logged by either party – in contrast to 2012. In turn, this helped to boost public confi-
dence in the result, despite the fact that, in-between the two polls, Afari-Gyan had stood
down and been replaced by a less-trusted and tested chair (see below).78
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In Kenya, the period between 2013 and 2017 also saw many changes, but these did
not lead to the meaningful improvement witnessed in Ghana. Following the problems
of 2013, the opposition demanded that the IEBC be required to use new and improved
digital systems for voter identification without the possibility of any manual back-up for
the next election.79 In 2016, the law was amended to this effect, but this was sub-
sequently reversed to allow a “complementary” manual system at the insistence of
the ruling party.80 The opposition protested furiously, but unsuccessfully: as one pro-
minent politician put it “[w]e wanted technology to ensure ourselves of credible
polls”.81 The 2017 elections did, however, feature brand new technology in the shape
of the Kenyan Integrated Electoral Management System, or KIEMS, kits. This
system, supplied by the French firm OT Morpho – in a procurement process that
raised questions due to the absence of a competitive process – allowed electoral officials
to use the same piece of equipment to biometrically verify voters and then to transmit
the results both as a typed in number and as a digital image of the official results form
signed by electoral officials and party agents.82 The logic of having two forms of digital
results – and three overall – was that each would act as a check on the other.
Right up to the elections, held in August 2017, the opposition maintained its faith in
digital technology,83 and public confidence also remained high: “the gadgets should
work flawlessly and the elections should be free and fair”, declared one optimistic
voter.84 Indeed, initial indications suggested that the new model had performed well. In
stark contrast to 2013, the domestic monitoring team found that KIEMS kits were
present in almost all polling stations and failed to verify voters in just 4.8%. Moreover,
results quickly began to flow into the online system, which was connected to a new –
and impressive – website that allowed citizens to search results to the polling station
level. However, as more information about the election began to trickle out, it transpired
that some parts of the system had not been strengthened. Most notably, around a quarter
of the scanned forms were not transmitted andmade available by the time that the election
result was announced. It also transpired that the passwords of senior election officials were
used to access the system thousands of times – potentially by different people. Taken
together with the refusal of the IEBC to provide information and access to its servers
and other unexplained events – most notably, the murder of Chris Msando, the IEBC’s
acting heading of information technology, less than a week before the polls85 – these
factors compounded issues of limited transparency and were enough to undermine the
credibility of the election. Although the court did not determine whether the president
received fewer votes than his rivals, a majority of judges ruled that the procedural limit-
ations of the election – many of them digital – were sufficient to render it illegal.
It is still not clear exactly what happened in the weeks leading up to the polls that led
to this outcome, but statements from key players suggest that once again procedural
improvements had been undermined by political interference. Following the nullifica-
tion of the presidential election, first, one of the Commissioners, Roselyn Akombe, and
later the Chair of the Commission, Wafula Chebukati, broke ranks to complain that
essential reforms were being blocked as a result of direct government interference in
the inner workings of the electoral body.86
We therefore have strong evidence that the comparatively successful bedding-in of
digital election technology in Ghana and the continued failure of technology to generate
credible elections in Kenya are rooted – if not fully explained – in variations in the
quality of democracy and the political independence of the electoral management
body. As Cheeseman and Klaas have argued, when electoral commissions operate
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under the influence of the ruling party, “making the most of new technology will require
it to be transferred into the hands of independent civil society groups and opposition
parties”87 – a point to which we return below.
The Kenyan case is also instructive because it highlights the way in which the opaque
nature of digital technologies may undermine public confidence in electoral processes
even when they generate considerable improvements. When opposition leaders rejected
the official results in August 2017, they did not just suggest that there had been a
number of specific problems; rather, they alleged that the digital system had facilitated
rigging, that the whole system had been hacked, and that all of the results were “com-
puter-generated”.88 This accusation resonated with opposition supporters, whose con-
fidence in elections had been eroded by past experience and recent events, including
Msando’s murder and questions over the IEBC’s procurement processes. At the same
time, the limited knowledge of many citizens and commentators regarding how
digital processes actually work meant that it was extremely difficult to differentiate
false claims from plausible ones. This was revealed in comical fashion when the opposi-
tion claimed to have a print-out of the log of activity on the IEBC’s servers and distrib-
uted it at a press conference only for none of the media, analysts and observers present
to have the skills necessary to be able to tell if it was genuine.89
It later transpired that the data provided at that event could not substantiate the claim
of hacking (which is not to say that it did not occur), but this was long after reports of the
accusation had been circulated. Unsurprisingly, ordinary citizens were no more confident
that they knew what was going on than those employed to cover the process. A nationally
representative survey conducted by IPSOS Kenya two months after the elections found
that just over half of all respondents felt that they “mostly don’t understand” or “don’t
understand at all” what happened during the process of vote counting, and that only a
minority of Kenyans (49%) believed that the victorious candidate had “really won”.
Thus, the use of new and improved digital processes did little to boost either the credi-
bility of the polls, or public confidence in the legitimacy of the outcome. That this hap-
pened in Kenya, where as we saw in an earlier section citizens tend to favour digital
processes almost come what may, demonstrates just what a damaging effect these
kinds of controversies can have. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the loss
of transparency, which Yard argues often goes hand-in-hand with digitization,90 may
have a particularly detrimental impact on public confidence once rigging is alleged.
Of course, technology does not always fail when introduced into difficult conditions,
and there have been some less negative experiences in equally challenging circumstances,
such as Nigeria in 2015. However, as we note above, the claims made for digital technol-
ogy in that country have been overblown. Moreover, one reason that effectively rolling
out new systems is particularly challenging in the Nigerian context is that the chair of
the electoral commission does not actually control all relevant appointments. Instead,
it is the president who appoints the Resident Electoral Commissioners who play a signifi-
cant role in coordinating elections at the state level.91 Given this, it is clear that even some
of the less problematic cases demonstrate the significance of the quality of democracy, and
the independence of key institutions, to the efficacy of digitization.
Opportunity costs and the risk of complacency
A final problem with the use of digital election technology is that when it is treated as a
silver bullet, international donors and opposition parties may become complacent
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about the threat of rigging and pay less attention to other forms of detecting and deter-
ring manipulation. This is particularly problematic given the potential for political
interference to subvert the role of the electoral commission, and hence digital pro-
cesses.92 Significantly, the great cost of new technology described above often means
that there is less space in donor budgets to fund other projects. As a Democracy Report-
ing International report notes, while electronic voting machines cannot “prevent inti-
midation, vote buying, media bias, low participation by women, the abuse of state
resources by incumbent parties or endemic political and electoral violence… their
enormous financial costs and the changes involved with their use… divert energies
and funds from addressing these fundamental issues”.93
In other words, digitizing elections carries an opportunity cost, rendering other
options financially or practically unfeasible. As a result, alternative areas of investment,
such as domestic observation groups, often find that their requests for more substantial
financial assistance are denied. For example, when donors decided to fund an expensive
digital voter registration process ahead of the DRC’s 2011 elections they simultaneously
cut the number of international observers, with the EU sending 112 to cover the entire
country, down from the 300 observers that had been supported in 2006.94 While this
correlation does not prove causation, the extent to which this pattern holds in a
number of different countries is strongly suggestive. Moreover, donor representatives
involved in electoral support work in Kenya and Zimbabwe told the authors that
given a limited funding envelope, purchasing expensive equipment inevitably means
they are forced to invest fewer resources in domestic observation unless there are excep-
tional reasons to increase the overall budget, such as new democratic openings.95 This
problem is not only a financial one, but also one of time and attention. Managing an
election, or a donor project to support an election, is usually a stressful activity, with
many things that must be done and not enough time to do them. In this context, intro-
ducing a new procurement process risks monopolizing the time and attention of a high
number of officials within multiple organizations.
The high opportunity costs of supporting digital technology are compounded by the
tendency for election technology to engender a sense of complacency. The deep-seated
belief in technology as a cure-all encourages an unwarranted degree of optimism in the
likely quality of the polls. Ahead of the Kenyan elections of 2013, for example, the faith
that opposition parties placed in technology went hand-in-hand with insufficient atten-
tion to the need to establish an effective system of party agents. After all, if technology
can be relied upon to provide an effective check on the activities of the electoral com-
mission, why go to the difficult and expensive task of building an effective party
machine to duplicate the effort? Partly as a result, party leaders did not invest
enough in internal party structures and failed to adequately monitor this process,
with the result that a considerable portion of the funds was wasted when it was siphoned
off by “middle men”.96 Along with other logistical challenges such as the need to coor-
dinate across numerous coalition members and the difficulty of locating agents in ruling
party strongholds, this contributed to a situation in which the opposition did not place a
party agent in over 10% of polling stations.97
The lack of attention and funding devoted to domestic monitors and party agents is
particularly problematic if digital technology fails and electoral commissions revert
back to manual processes. When this happens, opposition parties and donors often
find that their focus on new technology has actually undermined their capacity to
detect fraud. Following Kenya’s 2013 elections, for example, the opposition alleged
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that the technological failures were a deliberate strategy to facilitate the rigging of the
election, but struggled to evidence this claim, in part due to the limited reach of its
network of party agents.98
Significantly, opposition parties were not the only ones to place most of their eggs in
the technology basket; many international donors did likewise. In Kenya’s 2007 election,
domestic and international monitoring faced multiple challenges, as they have done so
often over the last forty years,99 but highlighted a number of instances of electoral
manipulation, which led to the EU going public with its evidence. Despite this, and the
danger posed by a further electoral controversy in 2013, the number of observers was
reduced. This was publicly justified on the basis that a smaller team could be more coher-
ent and organized – the 2007 monitoring process had often been chaotic – but was also
shaped by the fact that a considerable portion of donor budgets was diverted to new tech-
nology. While precise figures are hard to come by, the EU has suggested that the Kenya
Domestic Observers Forumwas 17,000 strong on polling day in 2007, while only just over
7,000 were deployed by its replacement, the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) in
2013.100 In this way, the use of digital technology may lead to disinvestment in other
areas that render elections more vulnerable to manipulation, not less.
By contrast, the value of not relying on official digital technology was demonstrated by
the Ghanaian general election of 2016. In the run-up to the elections, the opposition New
Patriotic Party (NPP) had challenged the reliability of the register, arguing that non-citi-
zens had been allowed to register. Concerned about the impartiality of the new Chairper-
son of the Electoral Commission, Charlotte Osei, the NPP kept up a barrage of criticism
of the electoral management body.101 As a result, the opposition party put extraordinary
energy into recruiting and training agents and creating their own tallying system.102 This
meant that as soon as the elections were over the NPP was able to put together a full set of
results – including photos of the “pink sheets” on which they were recorded at the polling
station level. In the event, this evidence was not needed because the official results gave
the NPP victory. However, some opposition figures believe that along with a parallel
vote tabulation conducted by civil society, was the existence of their high-quality parallel
tally that prevented electoral manipulation.103 Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear
that by operating independently and creating a system that would have worked even if
official processes had failed, the network of party agents established by the NPP generated
a check on manipulation that was in some ways more robust than that offered by the elec-
toral commission’s digital technology.
The challenge of safeguarding elections in new democracies
This article has documented some of drivers that account for the rise of official election
technology in new democracies, and raised a number of questions about its effectiveness
when it comes to generating better managed, more transparent and cleaner elections
around the world. Against some more optimistic analyses,104 we have argued that
although digital technologies have much to offer, they often fail to live up to
expectations.
On the one hand, even the most advanced forms of technology depend on human
input to no lesser extent than manual election management and are in certain cases
actually more vulnerable to manipulation. Significantly, this risk is exacerbated by
the difficulty of monitoring “black box” digital processes, especially in counties in
which the ruling party is able to exert control over the electoral commission. On the
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other hand, the procurement and operationalization of new equipment represents a
major logistical task that many electoral commissions struggle to perform. The ten-
dency for new technology to break down is particularly worrying given that the use
of digital equipment tends to crowd out investment in other areas and can engender
a sense of complacency. Consequently, when digital systems fail, opposition parties,
monitors, and donors typically find that they have weak back-up systems at their
disposal.
It is tempting to conclude that the best way out of this conundrum is to simply do
everything. International donors could, for example, support both digitization and an
expansion of domestic election monitoring. However, this is unrealistic given the
high costs of technology. Most new democracies now spend far more on holding elec-
tions than their Western counterparts, leaving few resources to be invested elsewhere. In
the context of growing pressure on aid budgets, there appears to be little appetite to
increase the budget for electoral support enough to fund a broader range of activities.
It is therefore important to either improve the chances that digital technologies will
work, or avoid using them.
This conclusion should not be taken to imply that technology is bound to fail, or that
there are no good arguments in favour of its deployment. As we have argued, biometric
registration processes are less prone to breakdown because they take place over a longer
period of time, and have helped to improve the electoral roll in a number of countries
such as Nigeria and Kenya.105 We have also seen that digital processes may generate
meaningful improvement in democratizing states when the electoral commission has
achieved a greater degree of political independence and authority, and that the efficacy
of new technology can improve over successive elections in more supportive political
environments, such as Ghana. This suggests that digitizing elections may be more suc-
cessful in regions in which neo-patrimonial networks have done less damage to the
autonomy of formal political institutions.106 It is also possible that further gains can
be secured by varying parameters that we do not have the space to address in this
article, such as the modality through which digital processes are funded and managed.
However, what our argument does call for is a serious re-think of the value added by
digital technology, and the conditions required for it to work. The evidence thus far
suggests that digital technologies are far less likely to deliver meaningful improvements
in some of the competitive-authoritarian contexts in which they are most needed. Given
this, digitizing elections should not be the default policy of opposition parties, civil
society groups and international donors. Instead, more attention needs to be paid to
the risk of failure given the political landscape in the country concerned. There are
some early signs that this message is starting to be understood. For example, opposition
parties have rejected the introduction of electronic voting machines in the DRC, arguing
that they would simply be used to legitimate – and facilitate – rigging.107 Adopting this
more sceptical approach systematically will require all actors involved routinely asking a
number of tough questions and answering them honestly. Does the electoral commis-
sion have the logistical capacity and political independence to carry out such an oper-
ation? Can checks be put in place to minimize the risk of government manipulation?
Does the local expertise exist to allow this process to be effectively monitored?
Unless the answers to these kinds of questions are favourable, digitizing elections is
likely to be at best a waste of resources and at worst a costly mistake: that is the
digital dilemma facing democracy promoters.
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